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ABSTRACT
The Sinaloa Drug Cartel: A Clear and Present Danger
(Under the direction of Dr. Douglass Sullivan-Gonzalez)

The Sinaloa drug cartel of Mexico poses perhaps the greatest threat to the citizens
of the United States of America. The history of this organization, an analysis of its
leaders and its current methods of operating, offer a clearer picture of its decision-making
power structure. The two-branched structure that the Sinaloa cartel utilizes includes
compartmentalization and extensive corruption within and outside of Mexico. This thesis
is meant to propose a framework to understand the Sinaloa cartel and point out areas in
which the cartel both excels and fails. This thesis is also intended to assist law
enforcement with background information on the cartel and how the Sinaloa’s past might
support counter-operations against the cartel in the present day.
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Introduction
If asked who the most wanted man is in this new post-bin-Laden world, many

Americans would picture another Mid-Eastern terrorist. However, the truth is that the

most powerful drug cartel of Mexico accurately boasts their leader as the most wanted
man in the world. Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman holds the mantle of leadership for the

most powerful Mexican transnational criminal organization— the Sinaloa drug cartel.
Originating in Culiacan, Mexico, the Sinaloa cartel reigns over an empire of misery that
extends to the four corners of the world. To many counter-narcotics officials in both the

United States and Mexico, that much territory and that many clients belonging to one
group seems impossible, especially in the face of the counter-drug efforts that have been
ongoing since the late 1980’s. How then could a man with the nickname of “El Chapo”

(Spanish for “Shorty”) gain so much power and retain it for over a decade? The answer
rests in the brilliant criminal structure that Guzman adapted, established and maintains—

a structure that actively resists law enforcement efforts while simultaneously maintaining
a substantial level of profits from customers around the world.
The two-branched structure that the Sinaloa cartel utilizes includes
compartmentalization and extensive corruption within and outside of Mexico, and it is
these two core methods throughout the entire criminal empire that enable the Cartel de
Sinaloa (CDS) to achieve such great success. Within this paper, corruption will be

defined as is inducing wrong acts by improper or unlawful means. Compartmentalization,
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as it relates to the Sinaloa cartel, can be defined as dividing an organization into separate,

cellular entities— each of which operate independently— yet they all remain connected
to hierarchical superiors. In analyzing these two major reasons for worldwide CDS
success, policy-makers can pass counter-cartel legislation while law enforcement can
impede the overall success of the Sinaloa cartel.
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Chapter 1: A History of the Cartels of Mexico
Geography, proximity to the United States, and Colombian support enabled the

Mexican cartels to come to life and flourish. The drug trade through Mexico flourished
with the country’s relatively open northern border to the United States and the two major

oceans surrounding it. One of the first men to utilize Mexico as a major entryway for
drugs into the United States was the Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar.1 Increased law

enforcement hindered Escobar’s operations moving Colombian cocaine into the United

States during the 1980s. During this time of decreased profits, Escobar began to seriously
use his connections within Mexico to transport his cocaine through land routes to the
United States which had less of a chance of being seized by law enforcement. Acting
decisively, Escobar divided the majority of his shipments through Eastern and Western

states within Mexico. On the eastern side, Mexican traffickers organized and emerged

into what would become primarily the Gulf and Zetas drug trafficking organizations

(DTOs).2 On the western side of Mexico, these early 1980s Mexican traffickers
established a base of the resilient Sinaloa drug trafficking organization. The immediate

success of these land routes promptly ensured that the Mexican traffickers who controlled
these routes would be taken care of well into the future by Escobar and his associates in

the Colombian cartels.

1 Nash, Jay Robert. World encyclopedia of organized crime. New York: Da Capo Press, 1993.
2 Malcolm Beith, The Last Narco: Inside the Hunt for El Chapo, the World's Most Wanted Drug Lord
(New York: Grove Press, 2010), 45.
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Between the mid 1980s through the early 1990s, drug trafficking groups on the

east and west sides of Mexico earned cash from the Colombians, which became a

growing problem as law enforcement agencies started to crack down on the drug
epidemic.3 However, as the demand from United States and European markets increased,
so did the size of the drug loads and their total value. The Mexican traffickers began to

realize that the bulk cash payments were too large to properly hide from authorities. In
response to this problem, the Mexican and Colombian groups arranged for the Mexican
drug traffickers to be paid in product, usually between 25 to 50 percent of the total load
they were moving into America.4 When this occurred, Mexican traffickers realized they

had the opportunity to set up local and state-wide drug dealing operations throughout

Mexico and the United States.
These newly founded Mexican drug-dealing operations had a two-fold positive
effect for both the Colombian and Mexican organizations. Principal benefit for the

Colombians was that their illicit products were more secure during transportation and
distribution, since the Mexican groups— who transported and distributed the narcotics—

now received a substantial cut of the profits from these same drugs. Primary benefit for
the Mexicans consisted of the opportunity to enhance their growing drug distribution

structures throughout the U.S. and Mexico, thus giving their organizations a welcomed
economic boost.

With this new transportation, distribution and cash-making system in place, both

the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels took notable steps to guard their organizations from losses of

either profits or product. The Gulf cartel, the major east-coast Mexican DTO, recognized
3 Drug Enforcement Administration. "US Department of Justice: DEA." DEA History: 1980-1985.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1980-1985.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
4 Ibid.
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that both Mexican law enforcement agencies and rival cartels hastily left the Gulf’s

business alone if a threat of devastating violence existed. Capitalizing on this fear of

violence, the Gulf cartel employed “Los Zetas” as the Gulf cartel’s violent enforcement
group. The Zetas— men formerly employed as Mexican Special Forces commandos—

protected the Gulf’s product, trafficking routes through the eastern coast of Mexico, and

its distribution hubs within Mexico.5 On the west coast, the Sinaloa cartel enjoyed a
towering level of success by using their high cash reserves to corrupt political, military
and law enforcement leaders into turning a blind eye to their activities.6 The idea was to

offer money before any threat of violence was made against a potential ally. However,
the Sinaloa cartel still employed smaller gangs to act as enforcement teams when the

corruption tactics failed. Arguably more effective than the Gulf’s typical violence

method, this Sinaloa “corruption-then-violence ” method allowed for the CDS to

anticipate law enforcement operations while still maintaining a low-level of exposure to
the public and media outlets. The Sinaloa cartel’s unparalleled intelligence of law

enforcement movements— provided by their corrupt contacts in police agencies—

allowed the cartel to plan many of its encounters with law enforcement. This intelligence
possessed by the CDS helped them control, to some extent, their losses to law

enforcement operations. The CDS’s uncanny ability to maintain low exposure to the

media and public scrutiny further allowed the Sinaloa cartel to avoid public outrage that
typically resulted with uncontrollable in-depth narcotics investigations.

5 Ware, Michael. "Los Zetas called Mexico's most dangerous drug cartel - CNN.com." CNN.com Breaking News, U.S., World, Weather, Entertainment & Video News.
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/08/06/mexico.drug.cartels/index.html (accessed December 7,
2012).
6 Marosi, Richard. "Unraveling Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel."Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/24/local/la-me-cartel-20110724 (accessed October 9, 2012).
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Accompanying this monumental change for the Mexican DTOs— the sale of
drugs instead of simply trafficking them— the Mexican cartels rapidly became more

proficient in their trade by arranging their organizations in ways that boosted profits and
created the present-day societal challenges in both Mexico and the United States. One

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) narcotics analyst, Dr. Picarelli,
describes the drug trade and Mexican cartels’ professional nature as having, “[colossal]

financial incentives...to protect and maintain their trade.”7 Due to these massive
monetary incentives in combination with the application of violence against their

enemies, Mexican trafficking groups established a coherent network of organizations that
displays centralized decision processes, protected command and administrative centers,

compartmentalization, and specialized units for violent action.8 All these professional
mechanisms for the current Sinaloa drug cartel are a direct result of one man’s role in the
early Mexican drug trade— the “Godfather” of Mexican drug traffickers, Miguel Felix

Gallardo.9

Miguel Felix “El Padrino” Gallardo controlled all of the land trafficking routes in
Mexico during the 1980s, and consequently he was considered by many to be one of the

most powerful men in Mexico. Miguel Felix Gallardo began as a former police officer,

who was then trained to a level equivalent to that of a U.S. Secret Service agent during
his time as a federal protective agent for the Governor of the Sinaloa state in Mexico.10
Gallardo cultivated law enforcement contacts throughout Mexico during his time as an

7 Picarelli, John. "Responding to Transnational Organized Crime —." National Criminal Justice Research
Service. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/235889.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
8 Picarelli, John. "Responding to Transnational Organized Crime —." National Criminal Justice Research
Service. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/235889.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
9 Beith, 47.
10 Ibid.
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officer, and as a federal agent he observed the low pay, the poor hours and the lack of
enthusiasm that Mexican federal law enforcement agents had for their jobs.11 Once
Gallardo held what he saw as the necessary connections, he broke away from the

legitimate law enforcement community, taking with him men who had skills or additional

corrupt contacts that would further Gallardo’s drug business. Under the expert tutelage of
Pedro Aviles Perez, Gallardo quickly became one of the largest drug lords in Mexico.
Pedro Perez was a first-generation Mexican drug dealer who retained power from the

1960s through the mid-1970s. Perez’s assistance allowed Gallardo to gain traction and

respect within the relatively small narcotics community that existed at that time.12
Gallardo had several skills that he brought to the table in his new drug distribution
business. As a former police officer and bodyguard, Gallardo corrupted other officers and

agents by appealing to their needs and desires.13 He was also able to make educated
choices about what officers and agents could not be corrupted, and those that might be

eliminated to protect his burgeoning business.14 Gallardo and his former law enforcement
companions also corrupted state officials who knew Gallardo from when he was a

bodyguard— these state-level politicians were the first of many whom Gallardo and his
companions utilized for valuable intelligence and political protection. Gallardo’s ascent

to power in the Mexican drug trade was so swift and comprehensive that U.S. and

Mexican law enforcement could not effectively act against him directly.15 Gallardo
further organized and planned his business structure to thwart any law enforcement
11 Beith, 48.
12 Ibid.
13 Scott, Peter. "Variant." Washington and the politics of drugs.
http://www.variant.org.uk/pdfs/issue11/Variant11.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
14 Drug Enforcement Administration. "US Department of Justice: DEA." DEA History: 1980-1985.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1980-1985.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
15 Scott, Peter. "Variant." Washington and the politics of drugs.
http://www.variant.org.uk/pdfs/issue11/Variant11.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
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efforts to arrest him or his associates. This careful planning and thoughtful organization
influenced many of Gallardo’s protégés and how they would conduct themselves in the
drug business throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
Perhaps Gallardo’s most legendary and successful action was the dividing of
Mexico’s drug routes between several different groups in order to avoid the possibility of
losing his entire business in a massive law enforcement effort. Gallardo’s action to divide

Mexico between several high-level traffickers was likely prompted by the fact that the
United States DEA wanted Gallardo in retaliation for the brutal kidnapping and murder

of undercover DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena that occurred in 1985.16 Due to the
immense pressure the Mexican government was receiving from the United States because

of this specific killing, Gallardo worried that his corrupt contacts might turncoat and offer

their services to the DEA or Mexican authorities. Gallardo called a conference of his top
drug traffickers from around Mexico in Acapulco, and during this meeting Gallardo

partitioned the enormous territory he controlled. The entire Pacific side of Mexico would
be controlled by Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Garcia. The Tijuana routes would belong to
the Arellano Felix siblings. The Juarez route would belong to Carrillo Fuentes family.

The entire eastern coast of Mexico would be left to Juan Abrego, who was a founding

member of the Gulf cartel.17 Gallardo’s overall plan and his continuing relations with the

new leaders of the territories exhibited brilliance. Gallardo clarified to the new cartel
heads that he was still in charge, due to his extensive contacts with corrupt Mexican
officials and high-ranking police. However, the new leaders now held power over the

individual transportation and distribution businesses; Gallardo explained that he would

16 Beith, 48.
17 Beith, 53.
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not interfere with whatever business methods they employed unless they threatened other

networks.

Gallardo’s reasons to divide up his massive territory were threefold. Primarily, he

realized that after ordering the murder of Agent Camarena, the U.S. government would
place heavy pressure for the Mexican government to come after him personally, and he
didn’t believe he could successfully manage the criminal empire as effectively as his

Colombian partners expected of him.18 Secondly, he comprehended that the U.S. would
be focusing more attention on the drug problem. Using his insight as a former federal law
enforcement agent, Gallardo realized that by divvying up his territory, police would have
to work much harder to take down the entire narcotics empire. Lastly, Gallardo placed
enormous faith and trust in his lieutenants, an uncommon occurrence today’s violent drug
conflict. However, it should be remembered that Gallardo was the unquestioned “boss of

bosses” and that his power emanated more from his contacts in the police and politicians
than through outright violence or clever betrayal. He was seen by many as a trafficker
who respected the people, and thus had the citizenry’s protection when local police or

federal agencies searched for him or his associates.19
Gallardo also acted as a mentor to several of the major cartel heads in today’s

Drug War. Chapo, the Arellano Felix brothers, and several of the Gulf leaders all worked
for and had close contact with Gallardo.20 His lineage acts as a key aspect of the modern

cartel world, particularly looking at the compartmentalization and corruption practices of

18 Public Broadcasting Service. "Interviews - Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni | Drug Wars | FRONTLINE |
PBS." PBS: Public Broadcasting Service.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/calderoni.html (accessed December 7,
2012).
19 Beith, 48.
20 Beith, 47.
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the CDS. As Chapo would later say about Gallardo, “he was the boss...and we all learned
from the boss.”21 The main issue in the modern-day drug war that Miguel Felix Gallardo

disapproves of is the overall level of violence and its effect against ordinary Mexican

citizens. Gallardo has been quoted saying, “to overcome the violence [in the modern day

fight against drugs], Mexico needs a program of national reconciliation.
ranches need reconstruction to make them self-sufficient.

villages and

violence can be fought with

jobs, but as of now there is only repression.”22 Keeping in mind that Gallardo’s action to
divide the drug trafficking routes has directly affected the current drug situation, a rough

sketch of Gallardo’s distribution of Mexican drug routes might be helpful. [See Appendix

Figure 1.1].
Transitioning to the near present time of the cartels, it must be understood that
there exists no simple answer to the question as to how Mexico and the United States

entered into the modern-day chaos, but there are several primary catalysts that helped
progress the situation to the present point. An important catalyst dealing with the increase

of corrupt police, federal agents and the military in Mexico will be examined in Chapter
2. First though, an examination must be made of the rise in demand for drugs both within

Mexico and around the globe, the distribution of drugs at a local level within the United
States and Mexico, and lastly, the reckless slaughter of the Mexican youth working on
behalf of the cartels in cartel-on-cartel, cartel-versus-police, and cartel-versus-military

conflicts. An in-depth look at these three methods for the violent change in the present
day Drug War, in combination with the important historical events that altered the power

21 Beith, 54.
22 Grillo, Ioan. "Autumn of the Capo: The Diary of a Drug Lord - TIME." Breaking News, Analysis,
Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1899404,00.html (accessed December 7, 2012).
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structure in Mexico, are useful in explaining how the Mexican Drug War escalated from
the relative calm of the 1980s to the sheer destruction that flashes on today’s news

networks constantly.
Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the demand for cocaine steadily
increased in the United States. This demand was a direct result of decreased street prices,

a better quality of the drugs and easier access for many U.S. consumers due to
increasingly expansive distribution networks.23 Crack cocaine developed into the
“wonder drug” for dealers during the late 1980s— nearly 30% less costly than that of

regular powdered cocaine, while maintaining a 35% higher purity assessment than the
powdered form.24 Early crack users in the United States could be found in large cities,
such as Miami and New York, where experimentation and recreational use was

commonplace. During the rise of crack cocaine in the United States, Colombian cartels,

like the Medellin cartel, were at their peak— from origination as cocoa, to cocaine’s

packaging, transportation and first level of distribution within the United States. The
Medellin cartel monopolized cocaine sales on the U.S. East Coast while their rival, the

Cali cartel, controlled nearly all of the West Coast.25
Looking at a brief history of the Mexican cartels’ predecessor— the Colombian

cartels of the 1980s— helps explain the ride of the transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) in modern day Mexico. Colombian drug producers controlled much of the

product during the 1970s and 80s, but they needed reliable methods to move their
products to their primarily United States consumers. The Medellin cartel of Colombia,

23 Drug Enforcement Administration. "US Department of Justice: DEA." DEA History: 1980-1985.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1980-1985.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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led by Pablo Escobar, was the chief cartel responsible for processing and importing
cocaine to the United States.26 The Medellin cartel overwhelmingly used ruthless

violence to control both the farmers who produced the cocoa, as well as to intimidate the

Colombian police and politicians. Due to an extradition treaty with the United States that

allowed Colombian officials to move suspected drug traffickers to the U.S. to stand trial,
abrupt violence was favored over corruption by the powerful Medellin cartel.27
Colombian drug traffickers easily recognized that the U.S. justice system was not easily
open to bribery and corruption, so the fear of prison sentences in the United States

became a crucial motivating factor for high-level drug Colombian traffickers. However,
the Mexican groups— who assisted the Colombians in moving the drugs into the United

States— saw the U.S. prison system as fertile ground for recruitment of new personnel
for both local and national enforcement gangs. In simplest terms, the Mexican trafficking

groups did not fear the U.S. prison system the way their Colombian counterparts did, and
therefore were able to quietly recruit new and valuable associates within America.
This sudden rise of drugs, particularly cocaine, led to numerous social problems.
Murders, robberies, crack-addicted babies and increases in other illicit drugs were major

problems that city populations were just not prepared for.28 Furthermore, the Mexican
drug routes into the United States along the 2,500 mile southern border were flourishing

with almost no intervention from either U.S. or Mexican law enforcement. The DEA, in
an attempt to stop this surge of drugs across the border looked towards public education

to partially solve the problem. DEA studies were conducted and agents released

26 Drug Enforcement Administration. "US Department of Justice: DEA." DEA History: 1980-1985.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history/1980-1985.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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numerous reports during this time detailing the harmful effects of many of these

emerging drugs, particularly cocaine.
Multiple studies of cocaine and its effects were produced by both the federal
government and independent organizations. For many in the general public, the specific

effects of cocaine are relatively unknown. Following smoking or intravenous injection,
cocaine reaches the brain in seconds, with a rapid buildup in levels. This results in a

rapid, intense euphoric effect known as a “rush.” By contrast, the euphoria caused by
snorting cocaine is less intense and does not happen as quickly due to the slower build-up

of the drug in the brain. Other effects of the drug include increased alertness and
excitation— as well as restlessness, irritability, and anxiety. A body’s tolerance to
cocaine’s effects develops rapidly, causing frequent users to take higher and higher doses.
Taking high doses of cocaine or prolonged use, termed as binging, usually causes

extreme paranoia. The crash that follows euphoria is characterized by mental and

physical exhaustion, sleep, and depression lasting several days.29 Following the crash,

users experience a severe craving to use cocaine again. The physiological effects of
cocaine are similarly repulsive. A single “hit” of cocaine can cause increased blood

pressure and heart rate, dilated pupils, long-term insomnia, and loss of appetite.30 The
widespread abuse of highly pure “street cocaine,” better known as crack, has led to many

adverse health consequences such as: cardiac arrhythmias, ischemic heart conditions,

sudden cardiac arrest, convulsions, strokes, and death.31 In some users, the long-term use

of inhaled crack cocaine has led to lethal respiratory syndromes, whereas chronic

29 Drug Enforcement Administration. "US Department of Justice: DEA." DEA: Drug Fact Sheet for
Cocaine. www.justice.gov/dea/druginfo/drug_data_sheets/Cocaine.pdf (accessed December 6, 2012).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.

18

snorting of cocaine has led to the erosion of the upper nasal cavity and parts of the

brain.32

Keeping these negative effects of cocaine in mind, it should be noted that many of
the drugs from Colombia were not leaving Mexico, and were instead radically affecting
the Mexican populace— a fact that many in the Mexican government attempted to
ignore. Numerous Mexican politicians and leaders enduringly blamed the United States

for the rise in drug trafficking and violence. Mexican drug consumption increased over

time as more Mexican citizens exposed themselves to illicit drugs destined for the United

States. During the 1980s and 1990s, Mexican cartels proved themselves to be reliable to

their Colombian handlers and expanded drug routes into different areas of the United
States. The position of these drug routes moderately depended on where the pressure
from local and federal law enforcement existed in the states. As the pressure from law

enforcement increased in both the U.S. and Mexico, Mexican cartels began to look
towards both U.S. and Mexican former prisoners to provide assistance with moving the

drug shipments across the US-Mexican border. Many of these associates held residency

near border cities such as Juarez, Tijuana and smaller border towns.33 The cartels would

pay these people to be lookouts, on-call assassins and sometimes trans-national
transporters of the drugs and cash profits.34 However, as territory conflicts between the

cartels increased in violence, these former felons started to get paid with drugs like

marijuana, cocaine and heroin instead of the usual cash.35 This distribution of drugs to a

32 Ibid.
33 “2009 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-threat-assessment-2009-pdf (accessed March
1, 2013).
34 Marosi, Richard. "Unraveling Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel."Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/24/local/la-me-cartel-20110724 (accessed October 9, 2012).
35 Ibid.
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local level created a major unintended effect for the border area— many of these cartel
associates became either unreliable addicts or indiscriminately sold their drugs around

their local communities— both U.S. and Mexican communities— with negative
consequences for the communities and major benefits for the Sinaloa cartel.

With the increase of general drug use inside Mexico, numerous social problems

have arisen that assist the CDS in the current Mexican Drug War. Between 1996 and

2008, Mexico’s consumption of drugs nearly doubled in many border regions, which
were under the control of the Sinaloa cartel.36 The same social problems that affected

major U.S. cities in the late 1980s and 1990s from the rise in drugs are now seen in
Mexico’s general population. The existing chaos in Mexico is a direct result of both U.S.

and Mexican consumption— a consumption fueled by the unrelenting sale of drugs by
Sinaloa members and their associates. Violent crimes have skyrocketed due to the

Mexican Drug War and the fight over territory that leads into the United States. Drug
addiction cases in newborn babies and teenager and have greatly increased, putting
incredible strain on the Mexican health and rehabilitation systems.37 The number of

youths involved with street gangs who report to the cartels has tremendously surged.38

Many argue that this increase stems from the illusion of power within these local gangs.
However some studies, particularly one published by the multinational counter-narcotics

treatment center Narconon, suggest that these at-risk young people may actually want to

perpetuate the drug distribution cycle within their communities because of the easiness

36 Narconon. "Mexico Drug Addiction | Mexican Drug Use." Narconon | Drug Rehabilitation | Drug
Education. http://www.narconon.org/drug-information/mexico-drug-addiction.html (accessed December 7,
2012).
37 Ibid.
38 “2009 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-threat-assessment-2009-pdf (accessed March
1, 2013).
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and immediate cash results that local drug trades enjoy.39 Furthermore, these youths, who

have grown up surrounded by the violence and chaos of the drug war, see no way out of
the situation, so they instead resign themselves to acting as drones for the cartels. The
Sinaloa cartel, which preys on these depressed and desperate youths, hires them for

dangerous assignments and uses them as expendable and relatively cheap personnel in

their battles for drug routes and territory.

39 Narconon. "Mexico Drug Addiction | Mexican Drug Use." Narconon | Drug Rehabilitation | Drug
Education. http://www.narconon.org/drug-information/mexico-drug-addiction.html (accessed December 7,
2012).
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Chapter 2: The Sinaloa Cartel’s Success Strategy
Which method more determines the success of the Sinaloa cartel: their
compartmentalization practices or their potential to corrupt within all levels of
government and law enforcement? Arguably, the Sinaloa’s strict adherence to the

practice of compartmentalization is decisive to maintaining their success and longevity.
Chapo Guzman’s skills and savvy in the drug business, which led to his current throne of

power, developed under the direction of his mentor— former Mexican police officer, “El
Padrino” Gallardo. Gallardo truly understood the importance of keeping the different

sectors of the drug business separate and stringently enforcing the application of
compartmentalization.40 The CDS divides its empire into very small segments of

transportation, enforcement, distribution and collections of profits.41 In every country
that the Sinaloa cartel operates, they have a unique, yet extensive system comprised of

these sectors, although the size of each sector can vary greatly between regions, cities and

even neighborhoods.42 These sectors, including the leaders that control them, are kept

entirely separate. This strict division of the cartel’s assets and manpower allows the CDS
to suffer little, if any, damage when Mexican law enforcement, rival cartels, or U.S. law

enforcement agencies impede or compromise any single segment. Depending on the size

and level of income within an area of control, there may be multiple systems established

40 Beith, 47.
41 United States ofAmerica v. Felipe de Jesus Corona Verbera. (United States Court of Appeals.) 7 Dec.
2007.
42 United States ofAmerica v. Felipe de Jesus Corona Verbera, 3.
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in the same city, town or even street.43 The CDS operates not only by a brilliant system of

compartmentalization, but also through levels of hierarchy as that shift with the size of

territories, amounts of profits and the magnitude of the cartels’ competition.
A clear example of this hierarchy and the success of the Sinaloa
compartmentalization method are seen in the July 2011 arrest of Luis Fernando

Bertolucci Castillo in the Dominican Republic (DR). The DR, which functioned as a
successful launching point for the CDS to reach European markets, existed as a major
area of control for the Sinaloa cartel. With such an important launching point to an entire

continent of potential customers, an argument subsists that there were rendition systems

set up by Chapo to protect this network that opened up Europe to the CDS. To support
this argument, Castillo stated during his interrogation that he held a direct line of

communication to Sinaloa leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman.44 In a joint statement
made by DEA officials and the Dominican Republic’s Ambassador to the United States,

“the Sinaloa cartel is seeking to create a route to Europe using the Dominican
Republic.”45 That statement marked the Dominican Republican government’s first public
acknowledgement of a CDS presence in their country.46 However, the most telling

information regarding this supposedly high-profile arrest in the Dominican Republic is
that the arrest of Castillo had no discernible negative impact on the Sinaloa cartel’s

43 Marosi, Richard. "Unraveling Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel."Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/24/local/la-me-cartel-20110724 (accessed October 9, 2012).
44 Anonymous (Security Reasons). "U.S., Dominican agencies bust feared Sinaloa Cartel drug
route." Dominican Today, July 18, 2011, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2011/7/18/40253/USDominican-agencies-bust-feared-Sinaloa-Cartel-drug-route-El-Dia (accessed October 9, 2012).
45 Feiser, Ezra. "Capture and extradition of alleged Sinaloa members indicate cartel spreading into
DR." The Miami Herald, April 4, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/13/2747093/capture-andextradition-of-alleged.html (accessed October 9, 2012).
46 Borderland Beat. “Chapo is Carving Out New Route In The Caribbean.”
http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/02/chapo-is-carving-out-new-route-in.html (accessed October 9,
2012). Blog posted February 18, 2012.
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activities both in the Dominican Republic and around Europe.47 After the arrest of
Castillo, there was no evidence that pointed to a decrease of the cartel’s presence in the

Dominican Republic. There was not a decrease in the amount of drugs moved to

European countries by Sinaloa transporters, nor did the violence levels in the DR increase
or decrease.48 In fact within the next 11 months, the DEA working in conjunction with
Dominican Republic anti-narcotics forces, continued to investigate and arrest more

members of the CDS throughout the Dominican Republic.49 These arrests and lack of
change in the Sinaloa’s DR operations give rise to two possibilities. One, the DEA and
Dominican police forces have successfully swept up the remains of a Sinaloa cell in the
Dominican Republic over the past two years and the Sinaloa are trying to rebuild their

presence in the DR.50 Perhaps the more probable scenario, however, is that the CDS

recovered immediately from the arrest of their high-ranking Dominican contact, Castillo,
and sent more men to restore and reestablish their former strength on the island-nation. If
the first possibility is true, then it would mean that the Sinaloa cartel has been operating

in the Dominican for an extended period. If the other possibility is accurate, then the CDS

has shown only a hint of its power and an even smaller piece of Chapo’s extensive
resources in claiming territory.

A simplified broad graph of this system of compartmentalization that the CDS
employs may be beneficial to those unfamiliar with illegitimate businesses. In the

Appendix, Figure 2.1 chart paints a rough version of the structure the Sinaloa cartel uses

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Anonymous (Security Reasons). "Dominican Republic reels from Sinaloa Cartel’s tentacles." Dominican
Today, April 10, 2012, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2012/4/10/43244/Dominican-Republicreels-from-Sinaloa-Cartels-tentacles (accessed October 9, 2012).
50 Ibid.
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in many of the countries, states and cities in which it operates. By looking at Figure 2.1,
the fluid, yet secure, compartmentalized business structure of the CDS can be studied in
an effort to destabilize the CDS. In analyzing the hierarchy shown in Figure 2.1, policy

makers and intelligence professionals can begin to form a plan to attack that may
eventually cripple Chapo and the Sinaloa cartel’s illegal activities in the United States
and Mexico.
With this successful structure in place for the CDS, Chapo has taken his profits

and developed himself into a Robin Hood-like symbol that allows the Sinaloa cartel to

avoid public disapproval and instead enjoy the protection of many Mexican citizens
throughout numerous states in Mexico. The single group in Figure 2.1 that has no

underlings and promotes this rags to riches mentality are the personal bodyguards of
Chapo Guzman— a feared and respected group inside and outside the Sinaloa cartel.
These men, who are mostly former Special Forces soldiers, protect Chapo while

simultaneously encouraging the mystique and kind legends that surround Chapo.51

Guzman is reportedly seen either all the time or never at all. Stories revolve around his
mythical presence at arbitrary restaurants, where he generously pays for the patrons’

meals.52 He allegedly appears with his bodyguards at Mexican celebrities’ weddings,
public servants’ funerals and even penetrates enemy territory controlled by Sinaloa’s

rival cartel, the Zetas, to simply hand out cash payments to hard-working legitimate

Mexican citizens and victims of the Zetas cruelty.53 This folksy legend of elusiveness has
made him a hero throughout Mexico, particularly in his home state of Sinaloa. Songs,

51 Wilkinson, Tracy. "'El Chapo' has left the building." Los Angeles Times, November 03, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/03/world/fg-chapo3 (accessed October 11, 2012).
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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called narcocorridos, are written and sung to honor his “benevolent” actions.54 However,
as surprising as these actions of the Mexican citizenry may seem to Americans, it should

be remembered that the Mexican government does not share the same image of
legitimacy as the U.S. government.

Because many of the local, state and federal police forces do not make it a priority
to earn the Mexican public’s trust, the Mexican population looks at Chapo as a man who
treats the poor with respect and protects his people from both the uncaring Mexican

government and other more sadistic cartels. Chapo’s bodyguards, an elite corps rumored
to be handpicked from international Special Forces groups, have been notoriously

difficult to find and arrest.55 Not only does Chapo supposedly employ former Tier-1

military operators to protect him, he has also been known to stay in high-ranking local
and state police officials’ houses when crossing through the country.56 These facts about
Chapo and his bodyguards allow a glimpse into the immense power the CDS wields
throughout Mexico. His travel arrangements are planned and executed in such secrecy
that one classified military task force formed between Mexico and the United States has

been unable to capture or kill him during the 11 years the task force has been active.57
This feat alone, along with his blatant taunting of both the Mexican and U.S.

54 Anonymous (Security Reasons). "Mexico hits 3 generals with corruption charges." New York Daily
News, August 01, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-08-01/news/32986158_1_arturo-beltranleyva-beltran-leyva-drug-cartel-dawe-gonzalez (accessed October 11, 2012).
55 Anonymous (Security Reasons). "Reputed enforcer for Sinaloa Cartel is busted in Mexico." Arizona
Daily Star, February 08, 2012, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/reputed-enforcer-for-sinaloa-cartelis-busted-in-mexico/article_ac2a9b86-38bf-5b3b-8475-6e0db53c8bb0.html (accessed October 11, 2012).
56 Booth, William, & Miroff, Nick. "‘El Chapo,’ wanted drug lord, grows stronger in Mexico’s Sierra
Madre."The Washington Post, October 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/elchapo-wanted-drug-lord-grows-stronger-in-mexicos-sierra-madre/2011/10/14/gIQAfcUDNM_story.html
(accessed October 11, 2012).
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governments, has earned Chapo top spots on Most Wanted Lists in both countries.58
However, the myth and legend the surrounds Chapo is only present because of his titanic

success both within Mexico and around the globe.

Guzman has developed structures for his drug business on six continents, set up
distribution organizations within most modernized countries, and has reportedly

established legitimate contacts with numerous criminal organizations abroad.59 Looking

at Chapo’s international success, policy-makers are continually stunned with the scope of
his criminal empire around the world. In scrutinizing the CDS’s presence within so many
countries, a pattern of supply-and-demand emerges that fuels CDS as a transnational
organization. One instance that highlights the reach of the Sinaloa cartel is seen in

Australia, a continent halfway around the world. In Australia, one kilogram of cocaine
goes for $250,000.60 Australia exists over 8,000 miles away from Mexico, yet the CDS

did not hesitate to smuggle drugs there. In fact, the CDS saw Australia as so potentially
profitable they assisted local Sydney gangs in developing enforcement and smuggling
operations so as to help these local Australian gangs avoid criminal prosecution.61 One
look at the potential drug profits from Australia by the leaders of the CDS allowed them

to make a simple, yet drastic decision— the CDS would start smuggling drugs to a new
island-continent. To put in perspective, one kilogram of cocaine that sells in Australia for

$250,000 would be sold in the United States for only approximately $30,000. The loss of

smuggling personnel due to Australian police force actions becomes a risk that develops,
58 Beith, 156.
59 Anonymous . “Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence." Stratfor Global
Intelligence. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexican-drug-cartels-government-progress-and-growingviolence (accessed October 11, 2012).
60 Burnett, John. "Mexican Drug Cartel Targets Australia." National Public Radio.
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/02/147821195/mexican-drug-cartel-targets-australia (accessed October 11,
2012).
61 Burnett, NPR, 2012.
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but is factored into every shipment, making the expansion into Australia and low-risk
high-profit situation.62 The Sinaloa cartel typical enjoys a 50-60% return of profits on

each shipment to Australia. The rest of the money goes to paying the CDS’s smugglers,
enforcers, brokers and corrupt officials.63 However, strict rules regarding smuggling
drugs for the CDS and the penalties for failure exist and are enforced ruthlessly.64

Looking more into the CDS drug smuggling operations around the world, the
specific arrangement of compartmentalizing the two main groups involved in smuggling,
enforcers and transporters, remains the major reason as to why the Sinaloa cartel

succeeds so often in successfully moving their products. Though the exact procedures for
moving a shipment of illicit goods vary from route to route, the overriding fact persists
that the Sinaloa cartel will only tolerate failure in transportation a limited number of

times before hired enforcement teams are called on to commit violence against the
smugglers. By having two groups involved with the smuggling procedure, the CDS’s
products (drugs, guns and/or humans) have several levels of protection surrounding them
and the resulting cash profits. The transporters know that if they try to steal any of the

products during the operation, a separate team of enforcers will, with near certainty, hunt
the transporters and their loved ones down to either torture or kill all involved.65
Ironically, the transport team also understands that the same enforcement group will
support and defend them if the CDS’s transporters are stopped by counter-drug

personnel. The enforcement teams are able to attest to the fact that the transporters were

actually arrested, thus vouching for the transport teams’ honesty and trustworthiness in
62 Scott H. Decker and Margaret Townsend Chapman, Drug Smugglers On Drug Smuggling: Lessons from
the Inside (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 50.
63 Ibid.
64 Decker and Chapman, 54.
65 Ibid, 56.
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any future dealings with the CDS.66 Furthermore, there are instances where rival cartels
or gangs have tried to rip off the transporters, but have been violently stopped by the

supervising CDS enforcement team.67 This paradoxical relationship between the two
teams allows the CDS to keep tight control over product movements into the United

States and overseas. Although there are transportation routes that do not operate with the
two-team practice, a large number of smuggling operations for the CDS work well with
the two-team technique.68 This two-team method can be broadened to local, state,
national and international smuggling operations.
In the face of such a well-planned criminal empire, some argue that the war

against drugs from Mexico is unwinnable in any respect. The Foreign Policy Research
Institute sees the situation as partially salvageable, but increasingly desperate. The FPR
Institute writes in 2007, “We can continue the war on drugs... but the likelihood of total
success is remote in view of the enormous amount of money involved in the production,

shipment, and distribution of illegal substances.”69 Present-day police action against

organized crime leads to arrests of mostly third and fourth-tier gangsters. The top cartel
leaders are becoming ever harder to imprison because of the compartmentalization that is

practiced within the main cartels, particularly the CDS. Furthermore, corruption is so

deeply embedded in Mexico’s legal system that the creation of a professional, honest,
national police force is realistically unachievable. Persistent dependence on the armed

forces to track and capture high-level drug lords is a certain method to expand corruption
inside the military, a Mexican organization that has customarily benefited from a lofty
66 Decker and Chapman, 55.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Grayson, George W. "Mexico and the Drug Cartels - FPRI." Foreign Policy Research Institute.
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200708.grayson.mexicodrugcartels.html (accessed December 7, 2012).
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level of public respect. Money from narcotics taints everything it touches, including

Mexican and U.S. federal officials, state and local law-enforcement officers. With the
billions of dollars in resources at their disposal, these cartels have minimal difficulty

obtaining security either from the police or from the ranks of the tens of thousands of
army deserters and veterans. A clear example of the willingness for the cartels to recruit
trained individuals is seen when the Mexican army raised the monthly salary for its

soldiers to about $1,100 per month in 2012, the cartels promptly doubled that amount as
the standard pay for its own "troops."70 Reports have surfaced that the cartels are relying
even more heavily on thousands of “Gatekeepers,” associates typically recruited from

U.S. and Mexican prisons, to transport upwards of 80% of the drugs from Mexico into
the United States.71 In addition to these problems within Mexico, the Sinaloa cartel

remains the most successful Mexican cartel in its distribution of drugs and other illicit

products to countries around the world. The CDS stands as an enemy that must be
addressed not only by the U.S. and Mexican governments, but by administrations and law
enforcement around the world.
In glancing at the Sinaloa’s clients and partners abroad, the CDS has proven time

and time again that it will make all necessary arrangements to supply their products to
any new congregation of customers. Narrowing in on the CDS’s presence in Italy,
evidence exists that the Sinaloa cartel works with an Italian crime group, the

‘Nhdrangheta, to supply up to 85% of all Europe cocaine.72 The Sinaloa cartel perhaps

70 Grayson, George W. "Mexico and the Drug Cartels - FPRI." Foreign Policy Research Institute.
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200708.grayson.mexicodrugcartels.html (accessed December 7, 2012).
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chose to use the more flexible structure of the ‘Nhdrangheta organization as opposed to
the more feared Cosa Nostra organization because the more loosely based ‘Nhdrangheta

group is more compartmentalized. This fact probably appealed to the CDS’s need for
security in their overseas drug operations. The ‘Nhdrangheta’s compartmentalized

structure, in combination with the Sinaloa’s successful overseas smuggling operations,

allowed for a long-term drug empire that could drastically distress European countries.73
This new Italian connection for the CDS in Europe reveals three essential conclusions.

One, the old days of the Colombian cartels ruling the drug trade around the world have
mostly faded away. Second, the Sinaloa cartel has an active “marketing” part of their
organization that reaches out to other, similarly structured criminal organizations. Lastly,
there remains a large enough demand for cocaine and other drugs in both Italy and

Europe as a whole to make it worthwhile for the Sinaloa cartel to risk additional police
pressure from international police agencies.74 Originally, the CDS had decided to work

with the Italian Cosa Nostra through two Monterrey-based brothers, Elio and Bruno
Gerardi, who shipped cocaine to Italian ports controlled by the Cosa Nostra since 2002.75

Once again, the price for a kilogram of cocaine plays an important factor for deciding

whether the Sinaloa cartel should expand to new markets. In Italy, the price per a kilo
soars to nearly $70,000, whereas in New York a single kilo goes for only $30,000.76 Not
only do the talons of the Sinaloa cartel now embrace Europe, but the U.S. Drug

Enforcement Agency (DEA) recently announced confirmed links between Mexican

cartels, specifically the Sinaloa cartel, and criminal groups in African countries like

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria. The Sinaloa
Cartel also continues to have ties throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia and Australia.77
In accepting all these countries and continents in which the Sinaloa cartel

operates, the level of corruption that the CDS can bring into a situation becomes a major

concern for international law enforcement groups. With their vast resources and
straightforward intimidation practices, the global threat posed by the CDS grows daily. In

examining this threat from the Sinaloa corruption techniques, a look into the corruption

within Mexico must be made before expanding to the rest of the countries in which the
CDS operates. The culture of corruption that has defined Mexico in recent times emerges

as a fertile ground for the CDS criminal empire to emerge and flourish both within and

outside of the Mexican borders.
For as long as the drug trade has been in existence within Mexico, there has
always been some level of corruption, but recently the overall breadth and depth of

corruption has increased in response to the pressure to combat the drug cartels’ efforts.
The Sinaloa cartel faithfully follows the original Colombian cartel threat of “plata o

plomo,” which translates into “silver or lead.” This type of threat persists in Mexico

because of its simplicity. The threat places all of the Sinaloa cartel’s resources on the
table and allows the victim of the intimidation practice to choose their fate. The “plata,”
or silver, that is offered to the victim, an offer that the cartel will pay a certain amount of

money or drugs for the target of the corrupt to cooperate with the demands of the CDS.
By accepting the money, the CDS digs a hook into their victim by placing them in the
compromising position of accepting their bribe. On the other hand, the “plomo,” or lead,

explains the threat of what the cartel will do if the victim does not accept the bribe. The
77 Ibid.
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lead references early bullets, which were fashioned out of lead, thus backing the victim

into a corner. The message is clear: either accept the bribe money or we will kill you.

Recently, the Sinaloa and Zetas cartels have expanded their threat of “plata o plomo” to
include not only the direct victim of their corruption scheme, but also the victim’s family

and loved ones.78
To follow through on their threats to kill those who refused their bribes, the
Sinaloa cartel created efficient teams of assassins— assassins known as “sicarios.” These

killers were ordered to combat other cartel’s enforcement gangs, in addition to bringing
violence against all levels of law enforcement investigating the CDS’s activities.79 An
American citizen, Edgar “La Barbie” Villarreal, was originally the leader of one of the

Sinaloa’s most fearsome intimidation gangs— Los Negros. The chief goal for Los

Negros was to increase the number of overtly violent attacks against Mexican police
personnel so as to pressure the police to leave the Sinaloa cartel alone.80 Ironically, the

major rival of the CDS, the Zetas cartel, complained that La Barbie and his men enjoyed
high-level police protection, a claim the Mexican government vehemently denied.81 The

Mexican government is also attacked by many who claim that the CDS has not only

corrupted a large majority of the Mexican government, but that there are politicians who
are only in power to protect the Sinaloa cartel.82 U.S. National Public Radio reported on

the situation quoting Manuel Clouthier, a congressman from Sinaloa state, the home state

78 Colleen Cook, “Mexico's Drug Cartels” (CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C, October 16, 2007),
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of the CDS. “Drug-related murders average 200 a month in [my] state... the Calderon
government has been fighting organized crime in many parts of the Mexican republic, but

has not touched the Sinaloa cartel.”83 When asked if he thought the government was

going soft on the country's most powerful drug cartel, Clouthier responded, “It is like
we're trimming the branches of a tree, when we should be tearing it out by the roots.

I

believe that much of the problem of not combating [the Sinaloa] cartel has much to do

with corruption, fear and an overall lack of will.”84

To put it bluntly, the Mexican government has enormous police corruption

throughout the entire country— corruption that exists on all levels and within every
Mexican government agency. Frequent Mexican press releases thoroughly prove this

claim. Early in the Mexican Drug War, the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) and the
Mexican Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) were both rocked by corruption, scandals,
and an immense number of suspensions and firings. In 2006, both these federal agencies

reported startling facts— over one-fifth of all PGR officers were under investigation for
corruption, while nearly 25% of all AFI agents were being investigated for violent

criminal activity.85 This criminal activity included kidnappings on behalf of the Sinaloa
cartel, providing information and intelligence to CDS handlers, and even the extortion
and murder of fellow agents and supervisors.86 To put this in terms that Americans might

absorb, it would be as if 25% of FBI agents and 20% of the prosecuting attorneys in the
United States were working to help the Mafia’s criminal empire. This unparalleled level

83 Ibid.
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of corruption boggles the mind, but helps in understanding the true fight that Mexico
endures against the drug trade and the evils associated with it.

To really understand the violent situation in Mexico, a broader look at the

complicated situation must be employed. Mexico's numerous smaller gangs and cartelitos
have begun to ally themselves with the two most dominate Mexican cartels— the Sinaloa

cartel and the Zetas cartel. These two cartels approach the drug trade quite differently.
The common Mexican cartel use of the “plata o plomo” technique illustrates the different

modes of operation between these two criminal organizations. Los Zetas, an organization

founded by former Mexican Special Forces soldiers, tends to apply a violent solution to
any problem first— the plomo method. They certainly bribe people, but one of their

consistent organizational values remains that threatening and killing are cheaper than to
bribing.87 Rather than maintain corrupt people on their payroll for years, Los Zetas

choose to have a short time of bribery before they execute an uncooperative asset. On the

other hand, Sinaloa leaders like Guzman and Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia have

been generating and trafficking narcotics for decades, and have thus developed a more
mature and successful method of retaining corrupt assets.88 Guzman and Zambada got

their start in the trafficking business working for Miguel "El Padrino" Angel Felix
Gallardo, the leader of the powerful pre-CDS Mexican organization of the 1980s. Being

in the illegitimate drug business for decades, these Sinaloa leaders are much more
business-minded than military-oriented. As such, the Sinaloa cartel tends to employ the

“plata” technique first— preferring to buy off the essential assets instead of simply

87 Scott Stewart, “Mexico's Presidential Election and the Cartel War,” Stratfor Global Intelligence,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-presidential-election-and-cartel-war (accessed October 30, 2012).
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killing them and moving forward.89 Additionally, the CDS frequently and anonymously

provides U.S. and Mexican authorities with intelligence pertaining to its enemies rather
than taking direct military action against them— cleverly using the law enforcement
authorities as a weapon against rival cartels.90 While the CDS boasts several dominant

enforcement groups, all of which are fully capable of generating merciless violence

against Sinaloa opponents, violence remains as merely a single instrument at the disposal
of the CDS, not its preferred approach to each dilemma. This difference between the
Zetas and the CDS has placed the CDS in a more beloved position with the general

Mexican population, increasing their protection from law enforcement and intelligence

gathering operations.

Moving beyond the extensive corruption and differing cartel practices, Mexico

has learned the hard way that it cannot turn towards its military to resolve the problem—

it only worsens and intensifies the violence on several levels. The involvement of many
Mexican military forces has drastically backfired on President Calderon’s Drug War. The
increase in the levels of violence, the exceedingly desperate acts by weakening smaller

cartels and the new sophisticated and lethal weapons that have been employed on both
sides of the drug war portray the Mexican military’s involvement as a detrimental to the
overall anti-drug efforts by both Mexican and U.S. forces. The weapons, tactics and
ruthlessness of the cartels, particularly the CDS, has increased due to Mexican military
involvement. These three factors greatly contribute to the future threats posed by the
Sinaloa cartel to the United States and other nations around the globe.
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Chapter 3: Future Threats Posed by the Sinaloa Cartel
Looking at the future threats the CDS poses to the United States, the main threats
result from the Sinaloa cartel’s associates within the U.S., the increasing sophistication of
the CDS’s weapons and the lack of legislation that directly targets drug cartels. It is

apparent that the CDS possesses both the financial resources and a fondness for violence
that currently threatens the overall U.S. population. A more urgent problem, however, is

the CDS’s potential to solidify relationships with criminal organizations already

established within the United States. American street and prison gangs have helped
Mexican drug traffickers since the 1920s, so these business relationships between gangs
and cartels are not new. No one gang or Mexican cartel has exclusive agreements with
one another— it’s a free market between the gangs and the cartels. Recently this has
shifted, particularly when looking at the Sinaloa cartels contacts in the United States.91

Groups like MS-13 and La Eme— both of which have in the past followed orders on
behalf of the Sinaloa cartel— pose perhaps the largest potential and immediate danger to

U.S. citizens. Individual examinations of the groups that Sinaloa might utilize within the

borders of the United States— La Eme and Mara Salvatrucha—reveal homeland threats
that need to be confronted and neutralized as rapidly as possible. The loss of these
groups’ relationship to the CDS would considerably decrease the presence and power of

the Sinaloa cartel within the United States.
91 “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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The Mexican Mafia, or La Eme, is a gang that was formed in the California prison
system originally as a defense mechanism for young Hispanic inmates, but later grew into

a colossal syndicate.92 In the 1950s, young Hispanic inmates, for the most part those of
Mexican descent, were being constantly brutalized and harassed by the numerous
African-American gangs in California’s prisons. The formation of a gang that would help

defend themselves was made easier by the California prison policy of transferring
prisoners who were violent or in intimidating situations to other prisons within
California. 93 This constant moving allowed La Eme members to spot and recruit other

violent Hispanic prisoners for membership.94 By augmenting their ranks with some of the

most feared and violent prisoners in the California penal system, La Eme soon gained the
attention of the administrators of the prisons. In an effort to eradicate the group, prison
officials transferred prisoners whom they believed to be the leaders of La Eme to other
prisons, but this tactic backfired. Instead of fading away like the prison officials had

hoped, La Eme simply recruited more Hispanic prisoners from whatever prisons to which

they had been transferred. Through this broad and rapid recruitment effort, the size of La
Eme increased dramatically. Another unexpected result of the augmentation of La Eme

was an alliance between members of La Eme and the Aryan Brotherhood in numerous

prisons.95 While this alliance may seem unusual to many civilians, the association of
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these two groups continues to be one of mutual self-protection and defense against the

numerous black gangs that exist in many prisons.96

The connections that the Mexican Mafia has formed within the prison system in

numerous states within America could significantly boost the Sinaloa cartel’s U.S.

operation. By providing protection to many incoming Hispanic inmates in state and some
federal prison facilities, La Eme cultivates a sense of gratitude and respect from new
criminals, who are many times eager to return favors to the group that protects them. This

continuing circle of protection and favors emerged into a system of utmost respect and
obedience for the leaders of La Eme.97 Members of La Eme are ingrained to follow

orders like committing murder, theft, and extortion without hesitation. The penalty for La
Eme members not immediately complying with these orders is usually death, but in some
cases severe mutilation and humiliation are also used to make examples of less willing

members.98 The unquestioning nature of La Eme gangsters places law enforcement in a
dangerous and tricky situation of trying to arrest and prosecute the actual leaders of the
criminal organization. Furthermore, the profound emphasis of loyalty between La Eme

members makes gaining intelligence on their activities and their leadership nearly
unattainable for even the most seasoned of interrogators.99 This criminal arrangement

provides an opening for the Sinaloa cartel to perhaps have a mercenary army at its
disposal within the U.S.

96 Ibid.
97 Stephen Mallory, interviewed by author, Oxford, MS, United States, April 1, 2011.
98 Fred Burton, “Mara Salvatrucha: The New Face of Organized Crime?” Stratfor Global
Intelligence,http://www.stratfor.com/mara_salvatrucha_new_face_organized_crime (accessed March 1,
2013).
99 “2009 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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1, 2013).
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La Eme could further aid the Sinaloa cartel outside of the United States primarily

through its contacts in the criminal underworld and La Eme’s uncanny ability to bring
violence to enemies both within the U.S. and abroad. La Eme seems poised to infiltrate
even more South American countries because of its excellent contacts with drug lords in

many of these countries.100 In Colombia, for example, La Eme does not have a significant
presence yet, but by using their relations with Colombian drug lords and the smuggling

service they provide through the street gang MS-13, La Eme could quickly move in to

claim territory in Colombia.101 Many experts believe that this likelihood could only
happen if the FARC in Colombia were to sanction their arrival and expansion, or if La

Eme recruiters were deliberately placed within many of the Colombian prisons. In
Mexico, La Eme is steadily gaining more power. Many of the weaker cartels are using up

their own men in the constant fighting over territories. This loss of personnel would assist
La Eme if its leadership ever decided to take over larger areas of the US-Mexican

border.102
One important aspect that law enforcement personnel and policy makers should

be aware of when dealing with the CDS is their use of street-level and multinational

gangs for assassinations, extortion, and hostile territory takeovers. Arguably the most
violent group that associates with the CDS is MS-13.103 A concise history of the MS-13,
or Mara Salvatrucha, gang might be helpful in understanding how they could potentially

100 Fred Burton, “Mara Salvatrucha: The New Face of Organized Crime?” Stratfor Global Intelligence,
http://www.stratfor.com/mara_salvatrucha_new_face_organized_crime (accessed March 1, 2013).
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assist the CDS in gaining and protecting drug distribution territory that would greatly
profit the Sinaloa cartel.
MS-13 began in the late 1980’s in the Los Angeles Pico Union neighborhood,

which was primarily composed of Salvadoran migrants that had fled the civil war in their
home country. All of the founding gang members were ex-soldiers from the Salvadoran
army or guerilla soldiers from the rebel army. Many of these Salvadoran men felt
pressured by both Mexican and African-Americans who saw these new Salvadoran

immigrants as competition for the available jobs in the area.104 In response to this hostile
pressure from both smaller Mexican and black gangs, the ex-soldiers of the Salvadoran
army bonded together and formed the basis for what would become one of the largest and

most violent gangs in the world, named Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13.105 Originally, the
early members of MS-13 used the gang’s power and personnel to protect its members and

other Salvadoran families from the already present hostile Latino and black gangs in Los
Angeles. In the early years, MS-13 membership was small and only composed of men

who had served in battle in El Salvador and who were only of Salvadoran heritage. As

time passed, members of this new gang began to use violent methods to increase their

wealth through violent actions on the Los Angeles streets. Due to most of the gang
members’ guerilla training from the war in El Salvador, the gang became known for its
brutal violence and merciless actions in dealing with whomever they crossed. The
training and fighting experiences from the civil war in El Salvador had hardened many of
the early gang members. These well-trained ex-guerilla soldiers knew how to use
104 “United Against MS-13,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nov09/calee_111009.html (accessed March 1, 2013).
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effective tactics when terrorizing the black gangs that surrounded them, and their choice

of weapons, usually knives, guns and especially machetes instilled fear respect in other
Mexican gangs, including La Eme.106

Many of the smaller Mexican gangs were hostile and threatening to the new MS-

13 gang in its early years, but the larger Mexican Mafia protected and supported the new
MS-13 gang, and in return Mara Salvatrucha added “13” as a tribute to the Mexican
Mafia. The letter “M” is the 13th letter in the alphabet, so adding it to the end of their

gang name showed respect to the superior Mexican Mafia organization. The strong
alliance between MS-13 and La Eme is one of the most troubling and potentially

destructive criminal alliances that the United States has to face. To think of the potential
relationship between the CDS, La Eme and MS-13 as a military command structure

might be helpful for law enforcement operators. Suppose the CDS orders an assassination

of someone within the United States, they feasibly might pass along the information to La
Eme. La Eme may attempt to execute the order through their own members, but more

likely they would opt to pay an MS-13 clique to complete the assassination.107 A
successful assassination would provide payment in drugs or money for the MS-13 gang

members and would additionally solidify the trust the La Eme could place into that

individual MS-13 clique. Furthermore, La Eme and MS-13 would receive more narcotics
from the CDS, thus allowing for an increase in the CDS’s drug distribution network.

106 “United Against MS-13,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nov09/calee_111009.html (accessed March 1, 2013).
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MS-13’s reputation for using violence has helped the gang expand its control to
certain cities by killing off or intimidating other gangs in the surrounding areas to pay

tribute to La Eme.108 The MS-13 reputation for violence stems from their use of specific
weapons, particularly machetes and knives, to kill or maim their targets as well as from

their specialized use of military tactics.109 MS-13, like a modern-day military unit,
usually uses one of two tactics. Typically MS-13 favors the tactic of small, specialized

group operations— like mini-assassinations teams— but for larger territory takeover
operations the tactic of overwhelming force will be applied. In these cases, an entire
faction of MS-13 members may be involved in a hostile gang takeover of a certain

territory.110 Usually these hostile takeovers cause massive amounts of bloodshed and
resonate within neighborhoods for years. The businesses in the newly conquered

territory, whether legal or illegal, are then forced to pay a tribute tax to both MS-13 and
La Eme. MS-13 has asserted an additional ability, which could be useful to the CDS—

the ability to assassinate leaders with the government and police. There are precedents of

high-level assassinations of government officials in Honduras and El Salvador by MS-13

members.111 Reports of MS-13 gang members with ties to La Eme attempting to enlist
into the military and enter sensitive programs have increased since 2008. This developing
problem of gang members within the U.S. armed forces would open the door for the CDS

108 Fred Burton, “Mara Salvatrucha: The New Face of Organized Crime?” Stratfor Global Intelligence,
http://www.stratfor.com/mara_salvatrucha_new_face_organized_crime (accessed March 1, 2013).
109 Ibid.
110 “2009 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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to have access to classified U.S. information, new weapons and possible recruitment of

additional U.S. trained military personnel. 112
The troubling patterns of growth for La Eme and MS-13 in the United States
include states in the Northeast and some Midwestern states. Many of these states have

current Hispanic gangs that are rivals with MS-13. As seen in in the past with countries
like Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, MS-13 deliberately targets areas in which

their rival gangs work.113 Multiple arrests of La Eme gang members have increased in
both cities of Chicago and Denver, both of which have also had an influx of Hispanic

immigrants in recent years.114 Currently in the United States there are between 8,000 to
10,000 hardened MS-13 gang members, with another 6,000 to 8,000 associates or
potential gang recruits.115 The vast majority of these MS-13 gangsters answer to La Eme,

and because of this, the Mara Salvatrucha population must be included in the tally of La
Eme members and associates. Around the world, the number of MS-13 members has

been estimated around 30,000-50,000 hardcore members with up to 100,000 potential
members or associates.116 La Eme has about 10 members for every 500 MS-13 members,
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and this fairly strict hierarchical structure could lead to problems in the future.117 These

numbers are presently expanding, and without direct action from international military
and police forces, the combination of La Eme and MS-13 might become a CDScontrolled nightmare for both the United States and possibly other countries around the

globe. So long as MS-13 membership continues to rise and the possibility of a better

structured gang network due to the help of La Eme exists, the United States is looking at
one of the most menacing threats of the future. It would be in the best interest for the
CDS to insert itself into the La Eme-Mara Salvatrucha relationship in this early stage, and

it would be in the best interests for the United States to disrupt this potentially disastrous
affiliation.
The violent reputation and countless connections in the underworld criminal
community has allowed La Eme to form increasingly more stable relationships with other

gangs in the US and around the world— a prospective benefit for the CDS. La Eme
provides MS-13 members with well-paying illegal jobs, such as contract killing of other
smaller Mexican gangs, but they also provide occasional CDS drug contacts for MS-13
and other street-level Hispanic gangs to expand their illegal ventures.118 These contacts,

in turn, expand the scope and breadth of the CDS’s drug distribution empire. In the midst

of the cartel wars on the Mexican-American border in 2006, La Eme has supplied many
Hispanic gang members to Sinaloa cartel leaders for numerous reasons— personal
protection for CDS leaders within the United States, intimidation of rival gangs and even

117 “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment (accessed March 1,
2013).
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civilian murders.119 The present and future connections made between La Eme leaders
and the Sinaloa cartel heads need to be severed before the CDS can gain any more control

within U.S. prisons or and our streets.
The CDS also has contacts with organized crime groups around the world that

both assist and compete with the Sinaloa cartel in illegal ventures. Looking at Figures 3.1
and 3.2 in the Appendix, a broad look at these groups can be ascertained and further

analyzed. From Russia to Colombia, there seems to be a vast underground network of
crime. However, many of these criminal empires are determined by the boundaries of
influence that the criminal organizations reach into. For example, the Asian gangs do not

distribute drugs in Latin American countries, but they certainly assist the CDS by
exporting ephedra to the Mexican west coast so as to help with the production of
methamphetamines.120 Furthermore, Russian arms dealers, notorious as the best illegal
arms dealers in the world, are operating in Mexico.121 These Russian arms dealers are

capable of potentially supplying their CDS clients with state-of-art weaponry and
explosives, which no doubt would be used against rival cartels and civilians alike by the

CDS.
Perhaps the most aggressive threat that the Sinaloa cartel poses to U.S. citizens is

found in its massive collection and untamed use of a variety of weapons. The CDS has

been known to have access to numerous weapons including bladed weapons, handguns,

119 Fred Burton, “Mara Salvatrucha: The New Face of Organized Crime?” Stratfor Global Intelligence,
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and assault rifles. All of these are commonly utilized in the conflicts that currently ravage

Mexico and have been used in past cartel conflicts as well.122 However, the weapons that
the CDS possesses today seem to be increasingly sophisticated and destructive. In early

February 2013, Mexican Army troops captured a man guarding a weapons cache in rural
Sinaloa state.123 The weapons included three M-203 type 40mm grenade launchers and

customized mortar launchers. Also in the cache were nearly 500 tactical vests, 154

assault rifles, 2 anti-armor rocket launchers with ammunition and over 60,000 rounds of
assault rifle ammunition. The mortar launchers were designed to be collapsible and had
the ability to accurately launch 2 mortar rounds simultaneously to a targeted destination

over one mile away.124 Analyzing these weapons capabilities, an ominous scenario arises
for the future of combat in Mexico. The mortar rounds and long-range launchers in

particular are troubling— their range, destructive potential and the time to set these

weapons in place suggest that they would be used in a high-profile assassination or

against a fortified structure. The possibility even exists that these mortars could be used
for terrorist attacks against crowds in open areas. The CDS and the Zetas are both
reported to have stockpiles of these types of weapons throughout Mexico.125

Another significant revelation regarding the weapons in Mexico is the training
associated with operating different weapons systems and how the CDS has capitalized on
rural areas to set up training camps for their personnel. Several reports have surfaced

122 “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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stating that the Sinaloa cartel was requesting addition .50 caliber machine-gun

ammunition through their contacts in the Mexican armed forces. The ammunition was to
be used at one of several training camps.126 The higher echelon of weaponry that the

cartels are using indicates a strong change in the typical enforcement operations the
Sinaloa cartel conducts throughout Mexico and the United States. Training camps further

indicate that the CDS wishes to have high-performing operators on the front lines of their

territory conflicts. The combination of sophisticated weapons and trained individuals
handling these weapons paints a worrisome future for the levels of violence within

Mexico and possibly in other CDS controlled areas of the world.
The future of the CDS in Mexico and the United States seems fairly secure and

poses a clear and present threat to any who may encounter the group. Arguably, even if
governmental pressure against the CDS successfully curbed their drug activities, an

international rebounding result would take place— with Asian, Middle East, and Russian
suppliers replacing the Mexican distributors. Meanwhile, Sinaloa gangsters would devote

more attention to cultivating the local markets and diversify into kidnappings, murders-

for-hire, and bank robberies.127 The bleak future perpetuated by the actions of the CDS
can only be brightened through drastic measures by law enforcement, military, and

legislatures in every country in which the CDS operates. In researching the Sinaloa cartel,
several practical actions emerged which might counter the effects of the empire of misery
the CDS manufactures. International prisons for drug traffickers may serve as obstacles

against the system of corruption for which the CDS is so renowned. An international task

126 Ibid.
127 Grayson, George W. "Mexico and the Drug Cartels - FPRI." Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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force could be established that would collect, analyze, disseminate intelligence while

conducting active operations against the CDS. Finally, real cooperation between
international and national agencies must be achieved to fight this threat. Individual
agencies’ budget concerns, competing for media attention and dwelling upon

unsuccessful operations must be minimized compared to the overall mission of taking
down the Sinaloa cartel. The CDS survives directly because of the lack of communication

and collaboration between agencies in Mexico and the United States. In short, humility

within the law enforcement community may be one of the greatest tools against the
criminal realm that Chapo Guzman rules over.
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Figure 2.2

CARTEL TERRITORIES AND DRUG ROUTES
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